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Abstract: This paper studies the distribution of resources within families with
migrant member abroad. We derive a complete collective demand system with
individual Engel effects for male and female adults and children, and the respective
share of resources. The focus is on migrant-sending families in Albania, where
gender and inter-generational inequalities are relevant social issues. The results
show that the female share of resources is substantially lower with respect to an
equal distribution and do not benefit from father’s migration. Children have a
larger share of resources and benefit from their fathers migration, when women
maintain control over family decisions and when the proportion of female children
is larger (at the detriment of women).
Keywords: Intrahousehold distribution, collective demand system, sharing rule,
international migration, left behind, Albania.
JEL Classification: D13, H31, I32, O15
1. INTRODUCTION
In the unitary model of the family, household decisions are analyzed under the
hypothesis that the household is a single decision unit that maximizes the welfare
of its members. This unitary family is a black-box where individual consumption
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decisions and resource allocation processes are not taken into account. In this
framework, the head of the household makes all the relevant decisions, including
child and spouse consumption, as if decisions were optimal for the welfare of all
household members. However, the welfare consequences caused by unequal intra-
household distribution may be relatively large particularly in developing countries,
where the household endowment of resources is often meager.
How resources are allocated within the family is also relevant when the interest
is to properly evaluate the impact of a policy or other exogenous events on indi-
vidual welfare and to design public interventions aiming at favoring a more equal
distribution within the household, such as those targeted to females or children in
need. Rosenzweig (1986) and several recent empirical tests [Kusago and Barham
(2001), Mangyo (2008), Alam (2012), Dunbar et al. (2013), Bargain et al. (2014),
de Brauw et al. (2014), Vijaya et al. (2014), and Wang (2014)] have highlighted the
weakness of treating the household as an individual decision maker when studying
microeconomic behavior in developing countries, where highly variable socioe-
conomic conditions and culture may strongly influence intrahousehold inequality.
For instance, the impact of cash transfers on poverty among children depends on the
different response of each household in terms of the intrahousehold re-allocation
of resources [Alderman et al. (1995), Duflo (2000), and Jacoby (2002)], especially
considering that the identity of the recipient of a cash transfer does matter in terms
of outcomes [Lundberg et al. (1997), Duflo (2003), Ward-Batts (2008), Bobonis
(2009), and Attanasio and Lechene (2014)].
One way to study the intrahousehold distribution of resources is to model family
behavior in a collective setting, as introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), to identify
the rule governing the distribution of resources and intrahousehold inequality. The
collective approach enables the identification of the structure of preferences and
welfare functions of each household member. Most applications of the collective
household theory estimate the sharing rule between husband and wife or treated
children as public goods for their parents [Blundell et al. (2005) and Cherchye et al.
(2012)]. Children as bargaining agents were introduced by Bourguignon (1999),
who shows how to derive the sharing rule both between parents and parents and
children.
The present work follows this approach to describe how resources are allocated
among members of Albanian families, placing special emphasis on the conse-
quences of family splitting due to parental and spousal migration. It uses a collec-
tive consumption model based on a complete demand system with price variation
and individual Engel effects similar to Arias et al. (2004), Menon et al. (2017a),
and Caiumi and Perali (2014), but extended to estimate the rule governing the
distribution of resources between adults (female and male) and children.
In a similar way, Dunbar et al. (2013) implement a collective consumption
model, although not based on a complete demand system, in a development setting.
They extended the model of Browning et al. (1994) studying how resources are
allocated both between parents and between parents and children in Malawi. Their
main findings are that resource allocation varies by family size and structure and
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standard poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty. Similar results
have been obtained by Bargain et al. (2014), using a different identification strategy,
in the context of Cote d’Ivoire.
A proper implementation of collective models requires the sharing rule to be
correctly identified. While intrahousehold allocation is not (fully) observable, it can
be recovered using specific identifying assumptions based on observable household
data about the exclusive or assignable consumption of at least one good, such as
men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing [Browning et al. (1994), Menon and
Perali (2012), and Chiappori and Meghir (2015)]. Our identification strategy is
based on this individual-specific consumption information and the observation of
suitable distribution factors, exogenous variables that modify the intrahousehold
distribution of resources but do not affect consumption choices. Unlike most other
studies, exogenous price variation is exploited by constructing (pseudo) unit values
using the technique first introduced by Lewbel (1989) and applied by Atella et al.
(2004), Arias et al. (2004), Menon et al. (2017a), and Caiumi and Perali (2014).
Further, our empirical strategy can be used to analyze the impact of specific factors
on the share of resources for each household member. An endogenous binary
variable model estimated by maximum likelihood is used to evaluate the impact
of a family split due to international migration on the rule governing the allocation
of resources in Albania.
Albania is a particularly interesting setting to study the governance of household
resources within the family and describe how it changes when one of the parents
migrates. At the end of the Second World War, Albania was a traditional rural
society with patriarchal family values and patrilineal kinship system. In mountain
and rural areas, the social and economic structure was governed by the Kanun
code, a set of traditional and unwritten laws, based on patriarchy handed down from
generation to generation since the Middle Ages [Gjonca et al. (2008) and Vullnetari
(2012)]. This set of laws gave males unquestioned authority within the household.
For instance, daughters could not inherit, unless there were no sons. In this case,
the daughter needed to become a burrnesha (sworn virgin) dressing and behaving
like a man including in smoking and drinking habits, and, therefore, giving up on
forming a family. In the Kanun, the “blood of a woman is not comparable to that of
a man,” and she was considered as a “jar made just to bear.” During the isolationist
communist regime, the educational policies targeted on females tried to dilute the
patriarchal values of Albanian households, not entirely successfully. The family
maintained a central position in the society archetype of Albania and patriarchal
values resurfaced after the fall of the regime in the 1990s and the consequent
increase in economic uncertainty. The country partially returned to a traditional
family structure with the risk of relegating women – and indirectly children1 – to
a marginal role, becoming more and more vulnerable to suffering severe poverty
and malnutrition especially among northern communities.
In Albania, large migration flows out of the country represented an additional
challenge to the family model after 1990, especially in rural areas where poverty is
more rooted. The household structure has changed deeply since migration strongly
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affected family stability and role equilibria exposing the most vulnerable family
members left behind to the risk of chronic poverty. In the Albanian tradition,
especially at times of historical and political upheaval, temporary migration was a
normal practice. For example, the pre-communist migration was a consequence of
the Ottoman occupation and gave rise to stable small Albanian communities in the
South of Italy. The massive migration that took place after 1990 was dominated
by young males leaving a socially relevant portion of female spouses and children
behind [Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) and Mendola and Carletto (2012)].
King and Vullnetari (2012) and Vullnetari (2012) study how Albanian women par-
ticipate in the migratory process suggesting that they are often the most important
pillar for supporting the family migration strategy, when remaining behind, through
their participation in the labor market, providing domestic work and as caregiver
for children and the parents of male migrants. However, women are often left out
of the decision-making process. The absence of fathers changes the distribution
of duties and responsibilities, with implications for children’s development. In
our sample, when the father migrates, the administrative headship shifts to the
mother in 48.8% of families as compared to 6.0% of nonmigrant families, while
an elderly male takes the headship in 26.0% of the sub-sample of families left
behind.
This scenario reveals a double-sided research question. On the one hand, we aim
to understand whether and how mothers can manage household resources after the
father’s departure. On the other hand, we aim at verifying whether the shift of the
decision power to the hands of an elderly male poses a risk of returning toward
traditional values with the consequent increase in discrimination against women
and associated lower investment in child development. To address these issues, we
implement the collective approach to the modeling of household decision making
and link it with a recent stream of research on the welfare of family members
left behind focusing on spouses [Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Lokshin
and Glinskaya (2009), and Cortes (2015)], children [Giannelli and Mangiavacchi
(2010), Antman (2011), Antman (2012), and Chen (2013)], or the elderly [Antman
(2010)]. This literature argues that the change in family composition due to mi-
gration leads to a shift in decision-making power, possibly affecting individual
well being. However, none of these studies deals directly with transmission mech-
anisms behind the empirical evidence or models the intrahousehold allocation of
resources explicitly. Chen (2013) proposes a noncooperative model of household
decision making, finding that when the father migrates without his family, children
spend more time in household production, while mothers spend less time in both
household production and income-generating activities. Antman (2015) studies
the relationship between international migration and children’s gender discrimi-
nation in Mexico focusing on the spousal control of resources. She found empirical
evidence that a greater share of resources is spent on girls compared to boys when
the father has emigrated and the mother has greater decision power. Unlike these
studies, the consequences of migration are studied by explicitly taking into account
individual and intrahousehold distribution issues.
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To pursue this strategy, our study faces an additional empirical issue. The deci-
sion to migrate abroad is likely to be endogenous to the intrahousehold allocation
of resources. In the literature, international migration has been considered endoge-
nous with respect to many family outcomes such as consumption, labor supply, and
children’s education. Antman (2015) and Chen (2013) link intrahousehold gender
discrimination among children with father migration. Antman (2015) treats mi-
gration as endogenous with respect to household expenditure for girls and boys.
Chen (2013) adopts a panel approach to deal with possible unobservable factors
influencing both the decision to migrate and time use allocation. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first dealing with the potential endogeneity arising
between the decision to migrate and the sharing rule. Indeed, the share of resources
allocated to each household member can be influenced by a change in household
composition due to migration choices. However, the sharing rule depends on the
intrahousehold decision-making process, which in turn is also determined by fam-
ily values and culture. These unobservable factors may influence the decision to
migrate as well, thus posing an identification problem. This issue is addressed
by means of a post estimation strategy, applying an endogenous binary variable
model to the predicted shares of resources of males, females, and children, and
using as exclusion restrictions proxies for the migrant network [Mckenzie and
Rapoport (2007)], the historic propensity to leave behind family and community
social capital [Putnam et al. (1994)].
Our main results suggest that Albanian women are willing to sacrifice part of
their resource share in favor of their children, especially to daughters. This results
in an average resource share of 26.3%, compared to 35.1% of men and 38.6%
of children. This suggests that women in Albania are suffering severe discrimi-
nation in the allocation of resources within the household. When the control of
family resources shifts to the mother, she allocates substantially more resources
to the children – especially when the proportion of female children is larger –
often at the expense of her own resource share. This is in line with previous
studies on the impact of policy interventions aiming at increasing the relative
income of women [Duflo (2000, 2003)]. No evidence is found of a significant
change in the distribution of resources when the control of resources shifts to
older males. In general, our results show that, if appropriate policies are adopted,
there is scope to significantly improve the equitable distribution of resources and
power within the household while relaxing the excessive burden of migration on
mothers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the collective model of
consumption choices and specifies both the functional structure of the sharing rule
and the complete collective demand system. Section 3 deals with the empirical
issues faced in the application and the strategy proposed to address them. Section 4
describes the data used and the sample selection. Results are discussed in Section 5,
placing special emphasis on the factors influencing the distribution of resources
and the implications of international migration on the family members left behind.
Section 6 gives our conclusive remarks.
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2. THE COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION FRAMEWORK
Our collective model of consumption assumes that the family decision-making
process, conducted in a deterministic environment, leads to Pareto-efficient out-
comes provided that individual utility functions are well behaved and the budget
sets are convex. These assumptions of the collective approach are common to
all cooperative models and are necessary to implement the second fundamental
welfare theorem leading to the decentralized decision program [Chiappori (1992)].
Market goods are assumed to be consumed privately by each household mem-
ber.2 Consumption of private goods can either be assigned or nonassigned to
a specific member of the household. Goods like food items are traditionally
nonassignable because consumption surveys do not record individual consump-
tion of food. On the other hand, clothing is a common example of a private good
whose consumption can be exclusively assigned to a specific member of the family.
This individual-specific information, commonly available in household surveys,
is exploited to develop our identification strategy.
The household comprises two adults – one male and one female – and a child
indexed as k = 1, 2, 3. The family purchases N nonassignable goods ckj for j = 1, …N
and n assignable goods qki , for i = 1, …, n.3 Each privately consumed good qki can
be assigned to a specific family member, while for the nonassignable goods only
consumption at the household level can be observed, so that c j = c1j + c2j + c3j .
The associated vectors of market prices for assignable and nonassignable goods
are pqk and pc, respectively. Note that market prices of nonassignable goods are
not specific to each household member: they are observed at the household level.4
The set of demographic characteristics d = (d1, d2, d3, d123) describes observable
heterogeneity comprising the subset of characteristics specific to each individual
k and the subset of household characteristics common to the family d123.
The family decision problem can be decentralized in two stages. In the first stage,
household members decide how to share total household expenditure y assigning
to each of them a given amount φk of the household resources so that y = φ1 +
φ2 + φ3. The function φk represents the sharing rule and must be strictly positive
(φk > 0). Then, in the second stage, each member chooses his/her own optimal
consumption bundle maximizing the utility function given the budget constraint.




uk (ck, qk; d)
subject to his/her own budget constraint
p′cc
k + p′qk qk = φk,
where in line with the caring assumption, individual utility functions may also be
affected by characteristics of the other household members. The solution to this
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problem yields the following individual Marshallian demand functions:
q̂k = qk (pc, pqk , φk, d) ,
ĉk = ck (pc, pqk , φk, d) ,
where optimal consumption of the nonassignable good is observed at the household
level as a function of the sharing rule, prices, and demographic attributes.
The aggregate collective Marshallian demand system at the household level is
q̂
(
pc, pq1 , pq2 , pq3 , y, d
) = q1 (pc, pq1 , φ1, d) + q2 (pc, pq2 , φ2, d)
+ q3 (pc, pq3 , φ3, d) ,
ĉ
(
pc, pq1 , pq2 , pq3 , y, d
) = c1 (pc, pq1 , φ1, d) + c2 (pc, pq2 , φ2, d)
+ c3 (pc, pq3 , φ3, d) .
2.1. The Collective Demand System
Extending Menon et al. (2017a), the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS) [Banks et al. (1997)] is now derived for a collective model includ-
ing three household members. Let the extended PIGLOG individual expenditure
function be
ln yk (uk, p) = ln Ak (p) + ϕ(uk )Bk (p)
1 − ϕ(uk )λk (p) = ln Ak (p) +
Bk (p)
ϕ(uk )−1 − λk (p) ,
where ϕ(uk)−1 is decreasing in utility. In line with the tradition of the Almost
Ideal demand systems, the differentiable and concave price aggregators have the
following functional forms:



























The translog term Ak (p) can be interpreted as the level of subsistence expendi-
ture of individual k when uk = 0. It is a portion of household subsistence expen-
diture. It is assumed that each member has equal access to household subsistence
expenditure as if each member faced the same individual shadow prices and thus
define ln Ak (p) = G−1 ln A (p), where G is the number of groups of individuals
in the family, in our case an adult male, an adult female and a child.5 The price
aggregators Bk (p) and λk (p) are associated with individual utility variation, in the
expenditure definition, and with individual incomes in the budget share equation. It
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By Shephard’s lemma, the individual budget share of good i is given by the
following Hicksian demand:
wki =
∂ ln yk (uk, p)
∂ ln pi




∂ ln Bk (p)
∂ ln pi
(
ϕ (uk )−1 − λk (p)
) + Bk (p) ∂λk (p)∂ ln pi
]
(
ϕ (uk )−1 − λk (p)
)2 . (1)
The inversion of the individual expenditure function gives the value of
ϕ (uk )
−1 − λk (p) = Bk (p) / (ln yk (uk, p) − ln Ak (p)) ,
that substituted into equation (1) yields the individual budget share of good i
wki =
∂ ln Ak (p)
∂ ln pi
+ βki (ln yk − ln Ak (p)) + λki
(ln yk − ln Ak (p))2
Bk (p)
.
Because in our case individual quantities are not known, decentralized budget
shares as derived above cannot be estimated. Therefore, the budget share of good
i is aggregated at the household level as
wi = αi +
∑
j
γi j ln p j + β1i (ln y1 − ln A1 (p))
+ λ1i
(ln y1 − ln A1 (p))2
B1 (p)
+β2i (ln y2 − ln A2 (p)) + λ2i
(ln y2 − ln A2 (p))2
B2 (p)
+β3i (ln y3 − ln A3 (p)) + λ3i
(ln y3 − ln A3 (p))2
B3 (p)
. (2)
Observed heterogeneity is introduced using a translating household technology
ti (d) that modifies the demand system (2) so that demographic characteristics in-
teract additively with income in a theoretically plausible way [Gorman (1976),
Lewbel (1985), Perali (2003)]. Thus, the demographically modified collective
share equation (2) becomes
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γi j ln p j
+β1i
(
ln y∗1 − ln A1 (p)
) + λ1i
(
ln y∗1 − ln A1 (p)
)2
B1 (p)
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ln y∗2 − ln A2 (p)
) + λ2i
(





ln y∗3 − ln A3 (p)
) + λ3i
(




where ln y∗1, ln y
∗
2, and ln y
∗
3 are the log individual expenditures modified by a
translating household technology as




where for empirical convenience the translating demographic functions ti (d) are
specified as ti (d) =
∑
r τir ln dr for r = 1, …, R. The system of budget shares (3)








i , and λ
3
i ,
and the intercept αi, the price parameters γ ji, and the parameters of the scaling
function ti(d), which are estimated at the household level.
2.2. The Sharing Rule
In system (3), the individual total expenditure yk is assumed to be observed.
However, the data used in this study does not collect this information and the
available solution is to work with partial information, that is expenditure on ex-
clusive or assignable goods. If individual expenditure is deduced from exclusive
and assignable consumption only, it is by definition measured with some error. To
overcome this issue, we introduce a correction term mk (z) that captures the “trans-
fers” of resources from one member to the others according to specific variables z,
called distribution factors, that are assumed to affect the intrahousehold decision
rule but not tastes. Thus, the sharing rule φk (yk, z) can be specified as a function
of observed assignable expenditure yk and a vector of distribution factors z. In





φk (yk, z) = yk · mk (z), such that in logarithms it becomes additively separable
ln φk (y, z) = ln yk + ln mk (z).
This property makes the estimation of the sharing rule independent of income
as shown in Menon and Perali (2012) and Dunbar et al. (2013), and empirically
validated in Menon et al. (2012).
The portion of income of each member, yk, can be recovered from observed
expenditures on exclusive or assignable goods. Observed individual income yk
is determined on the basis of the ratio of the expenditure in exclusive goods,
σ k. Assuming that each member’s expenditure is defined as the expenditure on
his exclusive good p′cc
k plus 1/3 the expenditure in ordinary goods p′qq
6. This




k + 13 p′qq
)
meaning that ln y = kln yk = kσ kln y because kσ k = 1.
To make families with groups of different sizes comparable, for example, families
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with a different number of children, the σ k is computed re-scaling individual
expenditure to per-capita expenditure for males, females, and children. Let gk be
the number of family members belonging to each category k and g be household







, and the individual
resource share is σ k = ek/kek.7
The sharing rules can thus be written as a function of household income, distri-
bution factors and the ratio of expenditure in exclusive goods, i.e.
ln φ1(y, z) = σ1 ln y + ln m1(z),
ln φ2(y, z) = σ2 ln y + ln m2(z),
ln φ3(y, z) = σ3 ln y + ln m3(z).
Because by definition ln φ1(y, z) + ln φ2(y, z) + ln φ3(y, z) = ln y, the follow-
ing constraint on ln mk (z) must hold:
ln m1(z) + ln m2(z) + ln m3(z) = 0. (4)
The income modifying function mk behaves as a scaling index that describes
the transfers between household members. When the scaling function is less than
1, the expenditure transfer goes from, say, k = 1 to k = 2 and k = 3. The direction
of the transfer is inverted for mk > 1. Therefore, the scaling function mk explains
both the amount and direction of the allocation of resources between household
members. It also clarifies that the amount of resources allocated to member k, that
is φk, differs from the observable amount of individual spending yk.
In the empirical specification, the mk (z) function is a Cobb–Douglas, so that the
logarithmic specification is linear
ln mk (z) =
L∑
l=1
φlk ln zl ∀k = 1, 2, 3, (5)





k = 0 for all l = 1, …, L.
Summarizing, the introduction of the sharing rule through the mk(z) scaling
function modifies system (3) by replacing ln y∗k with ln φ
∗
k , defined as





wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γi j ln p j
+β1i
(
ln φ∗1 − ln A1 (p)
) + λ1i
(
ln φ∗1 − ln A1 (p)
)2
B1 (p)
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ln φ∗2 − ln A2 (p)
) + λ2i
(





ln φ∗3 − ln A3 (p)
) + λ3i
(




3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND POST-ESTIMATION STRATEGIES
This section discusses empirical issues related to the estimation of demand sys-
tems – such as the infrequency of purchases, the construction of household-specific
prices, the potential endogeneity of total household expenditure – and the post-
estimation strategy applied to infer the impact of parental migration on the intra-
household distribution of resources.
3.1. Infrequency of Purchases
Cross-section household expenditure data often involve positive as well as zero
purchases. The behavioral information contained in the observations with zero
expenditure has significant econometric as well as economic implications. It is the
manifestation of a choice that needs to be explained. In many cases, the household
deliberately chooses not to consume particular goods given their budget constraint.
In other cases, the realization of zero expenditure can be explained by the short
duration of the recall period of the survey design.
In our sample of Albanian families, for example, alcohol and tobacco expendi-
ture is censored in nonnegligible proportion. Assuming that the decision-making
process generating the corner solutions is based on disposable income, prices, and
preferences, a type-III tobit model [Maddala (1983), Amemiya (1985)] is imple-
mented in a system-wide setting using a Heckman two-steps estimator [Heckman
(1979)]. The sample selection bias is corrected by the inverse Mill’s ratio that is
the ratio between the predicted normal density and cumulative probability function
estimated in the first stage probit regression. This study adopts a generalized Heck-
man two-step estimator for a censored system of equations in line with Shonkwiler
and Yen (1999), Perali and Chavas (2000), and Arias et al. (2004).
Consider the following limited dependent variables system of i = 1, .., M equa-
tions:
x∗i = x(gi, θi ) + εi, h∗i = s′iτi + υi,
hi =
{
1 if h∗i > 0
0 if h∗i ≤ 0 , xi = hix
∗
i , (7)
where x(gi, θ i) represents the observed censored continuous variable of interest, hi
are the indicator variables, x∗i and h
∗
i are the latent variables, gi and si are vectors of
exogenous variables, θ i and τ i are parameters, and, εi and υ i are bi-variate normal
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error terms. System (7) can be summarized as
xi = (s′iτi )x(gi, θi ) + ηiψ (s′iτi ) + ξi, (8)
where  and ψ are univariate normal standard cumulative distribution and prob-
ability density functions, respectively. The element ξ i = xi − E[xi|gi] belongs to
the vector ξ ∼ MVN(0, ).
3.2. Household-Specific Prices
Because of the lack of quantity information (except for food consumption) that
would allow the direct derivation of unit values from expenditure information,
household-specific pseudo unit values are computed using the procedure adopted
by Atella et al. (2004), Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008), and McLaren and Yang
(2014), based on theory results developed by Lewbel (1989). Even when monthly
price indices are available for each commodity present in the expenditure survey
at a relatively small territorial level, such aggregate price indices do not have
sufficient variation to identify all parameters and to provide plausible estimates.8
Lewbel’s method consists in reproducing the cross-sectional price variability using
the variability of the budget shares at the highest level of disaggregation available.












where exi is expenditure on the ith good, wij is the sub-category budget share,9 and







with w̄i j being the average sub-category budget share.
3.3. Endogeneity of Total Expenditure
Demand system estimations are often exposed to potential endogeneity of total
expenditure. The main cause is measurement error, either due to the infrequency
of purchases or to recall errors. Although the potential endogeneity attributable to
the infrequency of purchases is already treated, recall errors are still possible. Thus,
total expenditure is instrumented using wealth indicators. Instead of the standard IV
methods, which in nonlinear models is biased and inconsistent [Terza et al. (2008)],
the control function approach is used. Similarly to the Hausman endogeneity test, it
consists in estimating an augmented regression formed by including the predicted
residuals from the first-stage OLS regression of the endogenous variable on all
co-variates of the main regression plus the instruments.
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Defining s a vector composed by prices of goods p, demographic variables d,
and a set of instruments such as wealth indicators discussed in Section 4, the first
stage regression is
ln y = sπ + ω, (9)
where ω is a spherical error term, whose prediction, ω̂ = ln y − sπ̂ , is used in the
demand system as specified below.
3.4. Specification of the Empirical Model
The system can be estimated by means of a two-step procedure. The vector of
parameters τ i of the Heckman correction is estimated using a Maximum Likeli-
hood probit estimator to obtain the predicted cumulative and probability density
functions ̂(s′iτ̂i ) and ψ̂ (s
′
iτ̂i ). Then the predicted residuals ω̂ of the endogenous
regressor (total expenditure, ln y) are obtained by OLS estimation of the endoge-
nous variable on all co-variates and the instruments. Finally, estimates of θ i, ηi, and
ζ i are obtained by Full Information Maximum Likelihood of the demand system
in (6), modified as
wi = ̂i[αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γ ji ln p̂ j + β1i
(























ln φ3 − ln A3(p̂)
)2
] + ηiψ̂i
+ ζiω̂ + ξi. (10)
System (10) is estimated imposing standard regularity conditions for QUAIDS
estimation: adding-up (
∑
i αi = 1), homogeneity (
∑
i τir = 0,
∑
i γi j =
∑









i = 0 for each k = 1, 2, 3), and symmetry (γ ij = γ ji,∀i = j) .
3.5. Post-Estimation Strategy
Turning to the objective of verifying whether and how migration of one parent in-
fluences the distribution of resources within the household, this section describes
the post-estimation strategy employed. To be a legitimate policy analysis, in the
context of a structural collective consumption model, the variable of interest must
be (a) a proper distribution factor and (b) exogenous. Being left behind by a migrant
parent violates both (a) and (b). Being left behind is likely to modify consumption
behavior because at least one household member is no longer consuming. Further,
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both the distribution of household resources and the decision to migrate might be
determined by a common set of unobservable characteristics, such as family values
and culture. To deal with these aspects, a post-estimation analysis on the predicted
sharing rule is proposed. Because the variable of interest is binary, the analysis
is conducted using an endogenous binary variable model [Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), Sections 16.7, 2.3, and 25.7, and Wooldridge (2010), Section 21] estimated
by maximum likelihood. Compared to treatment effects models for observational
data, this model is robust to violations to the unconfoundedness assumption (or
conditional independence assumption) where some unobservable factors may in-
fluence both the treatment and the outcome. The model is also more flexible than
the linear IV models in the specification of the outcome equation, because the set of
regressors in the selection equation can be different from the explanatory variables
of the outcome equation. Still, to help identification, the explanatory variables for
the treatment equation must include at least one exclusion restriction where an
exogenous variable is significantly correlated with the endogenous variable but
not with the outcome.
The model can be specified as
o j = v jϑ + δt j + ν j,
t j =
{
1 if k jκ + μ j > 0
0 otherwise,
(11)
where oj is the outcome variable for the jth observation corresponding in our
context to the predicted share of resources assigned to each household member,
v j are the exogenous co-variates used to model outcome, tj is the endogenous
binary variable – the treatment – and k j are the exogenous co-variates used to
model the endogenous binary variable. ν j and μj are bi-variate normal error terms.
k j may overlap with vj, but is assumed that at least one component in k j is an
independent source of variation in tj, uncorrelated with the outcome. When there
are no interaction terms between the endogenous variable and other outcome co-
variates, parameter δ corresponds to the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and to
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). When there are reasons to
think that the endogenous variable may change some parameters of the outcome
equation, then interactions of the endogenous variable with those co-variates may
be added. In this case, the ATE and ATET need to be computed after the estimation
of the model.
4. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The collective QUAIDS is estimated using household data drawn from the World
Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey collected in Albania in 2002.10 It is a
rich data set containing information on household consumption, socio-economic
conditions, and income sources. The survey records detailed individual information
on education, labor market participation, health, and migration history.
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We select households with at least a child younger than 15, an adult male and an
adult female (2,260 obs.) and exclude a few observations with missing variables
(36 observations). The original sample covers 3,599 households, falling, after
selection, to 2,224 families. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables
described below.
The estimation of the demand system is conducted over five categories of goods:
protein food, other food,11 clothing, alcohol and tobacco, and other goods.12 The
other goods category includes expenditure on education, leisure, personal care,
banking, and other nonspecified services and goods. Unit values are observed for
protein food and other food, while for the remaining categories pseudo unit values
computed following Lewbel’s procedure described in Section 3 are used. Exclusive
consumption goods available in the data set are clothing and footwear for males,
females, and children, and expenditure in education, which can be assigned to each
household member category. Durable goods are excluded from the system.13
The set of demographic variables d includes14 head of household characteristics
such as gender, age below 35, having tertiary education; health status with dummies
indicating whether the head, the spouse or any child are in bad health defined as
a chronic illness or disability lasting for more than three months. To account for
enlarged families, a dummy indicating the presence of more than one couple within
the household is used. Economic status is captured by a family labor supply variable
that relates the number of working members to family size, and an indicator for
those dwellings that have no continuous water supply. Finally, a variable indicating
residence in a rural area is included.
The set of variables selected as distribution factors z traditionally used in the
literature includes patents education difference (husband–wife normalized by the
average education of the spouses), parents age difference (wife–husband normal-
ized by the average age) and its square, and the proportion of female children. We
also include a community level dummy indicating whether a relevant percentage of
children under the age of 15 work (either with their parents or in the market). This
is a question put to the community administrator asking whether in the community
there are children that work even for a short period during the year. Possible an-
swers include none, very few, less than half, half, more than half, most children. The
dummy is equal to 1 for all answers except none and very few. Similarly to Dunbar
et al. (2013), to instrument household total expenditure, a set of wealth indicators
is used: ownership of video player, refrigerator, washing machine, generator, air
conditioning, and car/truck. Even though other wealth indicators were available,
only the nonredundant ones were selected.
As discussed in Section 3, the left behind status of a family is not suitable to
be used as a distribution factor, which should not influence consumption demand.
Indeed, looking at Table 2, which reports test for mean differences in selected
variables for the sub-samples of left behind families and the rest of the sample,
Alcohol and tobacco, Other goods, Other foods, and Total expenditure have all
statistically significant different means. This rules out using the left behind variable
as a distribution factor and for analyzing its impact on intrahousehold distribution
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics (2,225 obs.)
Variables Trunc. % Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Budget shares
Protein food 1.89 0.149 0.084 0.000 0.549
Clothing 5.44 0.128 0.103 0.000 0.633
Alcohol and tobacco 42.56 0.017 0.025 0.000 0.249
Other goods 3.10 0.058 0.070 0.000 0.590
Other food 0.00 0.648 0.133 0.151 0.984
Observed share of assignable
good
Male 0.321 0.034 0.097 0.496
Female 0.329 0.037 0.138 0.660
Child 0.350 0.047 0.186 0.737
Total expenditure and unit values
Log of total expenditure 9.409 0.475 7.771 11.543
Log of price of protein food 5.875 0.671 -0.614 7.170
Log of price of clothing 6.931 0.941 3.596 9.412
Log of price of alcohol–tobacco 5.318 1.005 1.662 8.741
Log of price of other goods 5.121 1.090 1.406 8.303
Log of price of other food 2.857 1.336 -1.353 5.854
Household characteristics
Female head of the household 0.084 0.278 0 1
Female head of the household
younger than 54
0.028 0.166 0 1
More females than males in the
household
0.196 0.397 0 1
Head of the household is young
(<35)
0.159 0.365 0 1
Head of the household is old
(65)
0.123 0.328 0 1
Head of the household has only
primary education
0.551 0.498 0 1
Head of the household has
university education
0.098 0.297 0 1
Education of the head of the
household
2.060 1.532 0 6
Education of the spouse 0.776 1.242 0 5
The spouse is older than the head
of the household
0.072 0.259 0 1
Head of the household is in bad
health conditions
0.218 0.413 0 1
Number of children under 5 0.738 0.819 0 5
Number of primary school
children (6–11)
0.861 0.828 0 4
Number of disable working-age
members
0.246 0.431 0 1
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TABLE 1. Continued
Variables Trunc. % Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of elderly (>65) 0.328 0.470 0 1
Number of male adults 1.477 0.789 0 6
Number of female adults 1.517 0.716 1 6
Average age of children 7.478 3.910 0 14
Both parents work 0.131 0.337 0 1
Subjective socio-economic status 3.581 1.701 1 10
Dwelling is small (<40 m2) 0.136 0.343 0 1
Dwelling is big (100 m2) 0.135 0.342 0 1
There are no preschool services
in the community
0.208 0.406 0 1
There is no doctor in the
community
0.174 0.379 0 1
Household has a telephone 0.239 0.427 0 1
Dwelling has no continuous
water supply
0.314 0.464 0 1
Distance from school (in minutes
on foot)
13.827 12.528 1 90
Distance from doctor (in minutes
on foot)
20.524 20.174 1 96
Distance from bus (in minutes on
foot)
17.243 18.942 1 99
Presence of a hospital in the
community
0.368 0.482 0 1
Household is in Tirana 0.133 0.340 0 1
Household is in the coastal area 0.276 0.447 0 1
Household is in the central area 0.272 0.445 0 1
Household is in the mountain
area
0.319 0.466 0 1
The spouse of the head is in bad
health
0.255 0.436 0 1
Number of children in bad health 0.113 0.358 0 3
Presence of more than one
couple in the household
0.193 0.395 0 1
Employment ratio: number of
workers/family size
0.326 0.196 0 0.875
Household lives in a rural area 0.509 0.500 0 1
Number of rooms in the dwelling 2.423 1.066 1 10
Presence of a video player 0.215 0.411 0 1
Presence of a refrigerator 0.805 0.396 0 1
Presence of a washing machine 0.494 0.500 0 1
Presence of a generator 0.014 0.117 0 1
Presence of air conditioning 0.015 0.123 0 1
Presence of a car/truck 0.106 0.308 0 1
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TABLE 1. Continued
Variables Trunc. % Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Parents education difference
(wife–husband)
− 1.111 1.018 −2 2
Children under 15 working
(community)
1.538 1.508 0 5
Proportion of female children 0.461 0.357 0 1
Parents age difference
(wife–husband)
− 0.248 0.496 −2 0.526
Parents age difference squared 0.308 1.022 0 4
District share of migrants that
went to Greece (1990–2001)
0.746 0.250 0 1
District share of migrants that
went to Italy (1990–2001)
0.176 0.189 0 1
District share of migrants that
went to other EU countries
(1990–2001)
0.091 0.171 0 1
District share of migrants leaving
behind families since 1990
0.570 0.230 0 1
Number of associations
providing community services
4.264 3.602 0 14
Distance from services (in
minutes on foot)
17.198 14.661 1 90
Left behind 0.057 0.232 0 1
Log of remittances for the left
behind
0.646 2.692 0 13.911
of resources it is necessary to perform a post-estimation analysis. At the same time,
the decision of migrating is likely to be co-determined by unobservable factors
that are likely to affect also intrahousehold distribution of resources, posing a
clear endogeneity issue. As expected, as shown in Table 2, several other relevant
characteristics are different in the two sub-samples. Intrahousehold distribution of
resources is slightly different, but less than expected and is significantly different at
5% only for males. Instead, as expected, family composition is radically different,
as well as the characteristics of the head (proportion of female head, age, and
education), as well as family size, and work status. In particular, in left behind
household, the head is more likely to be female, young (<35), and old (65);
the head and the spouse have lower education; children are younger, there are
more elderly, female, and male adults, and the probability of multiple couples in
the household is larger. Finally, the number of members working is significantly
lower. This evidence alone would be sufficient to justify an instrumental variable
approach to obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of migration on intrahousehold
distribution of resources. As described in Section 3, the present work adopts an
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TABLE 2. Sample averages of key variables by left behind status
Nonleft behind Left behind
(2,098 obs.) (127 obs.)
Variables1 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Budget shares
Protein food 0.145 0.082 0.136 0.071
Clothing 0.123 0.098 0.120 0.090
Alcohol and tobacco
∗∗∗
0.017 0.024 0.010 0.020
Other goods
∗∗
0.057 0.068 0.044 0.053
Other food
∗∗∗
0.626 0.136 0.658 0.114
Log of total expenditure
∗∗
9.416 0.470 9.293 0.547




0.322 0.035 0.311 0.029
Female
∗
0.329 0.037 0.335 0.037
Child 0.349 0.048 0.354 0.038
Household characteristics
Female head of the
household
∗∗∗
0.060 0.238 0.488 0.502
Head of the household is
young (<35)
∗
0.155 0.362 0.221 0.416
Head of the household is old
(65)∗∗∗
0.113 0.317 0.284 0.453
Education of the head
∗∗∗
2.092 1.541 1.535 1.271
Education of the spouse
∗∗∗
0.805 1.264 0.299 0.634
Number of children under 5
∗
0.731 0.824 0.858 0.721
Number of primary school
children (6–11)
0.866 0.825 0.787 0.870
Number of elderly (>65)
∗∗∗
0.311 0.463 0.606 0.491
Number of male adults
∗∗∗
1.451 0.756 1.898 1.126
Number of female adults
∗∗∗
1.497 0.703 1.850 0.836
Average age of children
∗∗∗
7.594 3.885 5.557 3.834
Both parents work
∗∗∗
0.138 0.345 0.016 0.125
Presence of more than one
couple in the household
∗∗∗
0.179 0.384 0.425 0.496
Employment ratio: number of
workers/family size
∗∗∗
0.333 0.195 0.212 0.163
Household lives in a rural area 0.506 0.500 0.559 0.498
Note: 1. Asterisks denote t-test results on the difference of the means: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
endogenous binary variable approach, to properly account for the binary nature of
the endogenous variable.
The endogenous binary variable model requires two sets of regressors: one
explaining the sharing rule and one explaining father’s migration, and the lat-
ter should include at least one proper instrument (exclusion restriction) for the
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migration decision. The main variable of interest in the outcome equations is be-
ing left behind, indicating that one of the parents has been abroad for at least three
months at the date of interview15, which is also interacted with the proportion
of female children and a dummy indicating that the head of the household is
a woman who is not elderly. The regressors included in both the treatment and
outcome equations are the presence of more than one couple in the household,
the average distance from services (bus, school, and doctor) in minutes on foot,
and area of residence (coastal, central, and mountain). In relation to the exclusion
restrictions, several variables proposed by the literature have been tested as ex-
ogenous explanatory factors for the migration decision: the distance from ports,
credit market variables, and the district share of families speaking Italian, Greek, or
English in 1990 [Cattaneo (2012), Mendola and Carletto (2012)]. However, none
of them were a valid instrument for our model. A strong explanatory power have
been obtained using variables related with migrants network. The distribution of
countries of destination has been constructed for each of the 36 districts in Albania
in the period 1990–2001, distinguishing rural and urban areas. Then, the district-
level share of all migrants that went to each of the top three destinations has been
used as a proxy for the strength of migrants network in the year of the survey. It
is also included the historical district share of migrants who left behind a family
member using the average value in the post-communist period 1990–2001, in line
with Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007). For both variables, the same exogenous data
source is used: the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey 2005. While the
first can be considered a good instrument for international migration in general, the
latter is more specific to our variable of interest. Indeed, migrants who leave behind
their family members are only one part of the migration flow, and the motivations
behind this kind of migration may varied. The period 1990–2001 is before the year
of the survey and covers the three main peaks of outflows: 1991–92, immediately
after the fall of communism; 1997, when the corrupt system of pyramid savings
schemes collapsed, bankrupting a large number of Albanian households; and 1999,
when the country was destabilized by the Kosovo crisis [King et al. (2010)]. The
chosen time span also accounts for regularization schemes which let Albanians
acquire a legal status between 1990 and 2001 in the main destination countries [in
Italy since 1995 and in Greece since 1998]. However, even after controlling for a
migrant network at district level, there may still be community level heterogeneity
possibly explaining the decision to leave. As suggested by Putnam et al. (1994)
and a number of subsequent works, an effective instrument could be a community
index of social capital, which in our case is the number of associations providing
community services (such as village committees, political groups, parent associ-
ations, and so on).16 Given the very poor public services at the community level,
the presence of informal and voluntary associations providing additional services
and opportunities may reduce the need to migrate ceteris paribus.
The other co-variates explaining the outcomes include all the distribution factors
z plus a set of relevant household characteristics such as a young head of the
household, living in a rural settlement, education level of the head and the spouse,
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2017.24
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitat llles Balears, on 07 Mar 2018 at 11:52:44, subject to the Cambridge Core
INTRAHOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION 127
and family composition variables, such as the average age of children, number of
children under 5, number of children of primary education age (6–11), number
of disabled working-age members, number of elderly (>65), number of male
and female adults.17 Remittances sent by the migrant parent (in logarithm) are
also included. On average, the relative importance of remittances compared to
total household expenditure is 2.7% (Table 1), although the conditional mean is
about 46.6% , indicating that most families left behind are in need and the amount
received is substantial for family sustenance (for almost 20% of families left behind
remittances represent at least 80% of consumption).
5. RESULTS
This section presents the results of the estimation of model (10) along with the
corresponding individual elasticities and sharing rule results. The description fol-
lows with the post-estimation analysis of the predicted relative sharing rule used
to assess the impact of being left behind by a migrant family member on the
intrahousehold distribution of resources.18
5.1. Demand System Estimation
Table 3 shows the estimates of the first-stage probit regressions for clothing and
alcohol and tobacco. Relevant variables in explaining positive clothing consump-
tion are total expenditure, its price, the price of other goods, number of children
under 5, the absence of preschool in the community, and living in Tirana, all with a
positive sign. Those explaining positive alcohol and tobacco consumption include
total expenditure and its price, both with a positive effect, while the price of other
food, the head of the household being a female or young, or the spouse being older
than the head all reduce the probability of consumption. The number of elderly,
having both parents working and the subjective well-being indicator increase the
probability of drinking or smoking, while the lack of a doctor or a hospital in
the community reduce the probability of consumption. In the demand system,
estimation the magnitude of selection parameters η for both clothing and alcohol
and tobacco, significant at 5 and 10%, respectively, suggests that sample selection
bias might be more serious for clothing although the proportion of zeros is much
smaller (about 5.5 vs. 42.5% of alcohol and tobacco).
The first-stage IV regression for household total expenditure shown in Table 4
indicates that all wealth assets chosen as instruments are significant at least at 5%.
This evidence together with a partial R2 of 0.104, and an F statistic for the excluded
instruments of 25.32 indicate that the chosen instruments are sufficiently strong.19
Anderson’s under-identification test is strongly rejected, with a χ2 of 230.19.
Nevertheless, the coefficients ζ i of the predicted residuals in the demand system
estimation are never significant, revealing that endogeneity of total expenditure
might not be a severe issue in our sample.
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TABLE 3. Probit estimates for the sample selection bias correction
Clothing Alcohol–tobacco
Constant − 4.930∗∗∗ (1.146) − 4.477∗∗∗ (0.676)





Log of price of protein food − 0.112 (0.076) 0.031 (0.045)
Log of price of clothing − 0.109∗ (0.066) 0.050 (0.036)
Log of price of alcohol–tobacco − 0.063 (0.048) 0.395∗∗∗ (0.030)
Log of price of other goods 0.087∗ (0.053) 0.023 (0.029)
Log of price of other food − 0.049 (0.041) − 0.090∗∗∗ (0.025)
Female head of the household 0.302 (0.186) − 0.489∗∗∗ (0.113)
More females than males in the
household
− 0.208 (0.128) − 0.081 (0.082)
Head of the household is young
(<35)
0.080 (0.135) − 0.125 (0.084)
Head of the household has only
primary education
− 0.189 (0.116) 0.091 (0.067)
Head of the household has
university education
− 0.003 (0.285) − 0.096 (0.110)
The spouse is older than the head
of the household
0.011 (0.181) − 0.325∗∗∗ (0.113)
Head of the household is in bad
health
− 0.070 (0.113) 0.036 (0.074)
Number of children under 5 0.107∗ (0.065) 0.031 (0.038)
Number of elderly − 0.124 (0.118) 0.252∗∗∗ (0.072)
Both parents work − 0.126 (0.157) 0.228∗∗ (0.096)
Subjective socio-economic status 0.029 (0.036) 0.048
∗∗
(0.021)
Dwelling is small (<40 m2) − 0.151 (0.129) 0.072 (0.085)
Dwelling is big (100 m2) 0.002 (0.184) 0.047 (0.089)





There is no doctor in the
community
0.154 (0.140) − 0.303∗∗∗ (0.094)
Household has a telephone − 0.158 (0.122) − 0.112 (0.083)





Distance from school (in minutes
on foot)
0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003)
Distance from doctor (in minutes
on foot)
0.002 (0.004) − 0.002 (0.002)
Distance from bus (in minutes on
foot)
0.000 (0.004) − 0.003 (0.002)
Presence of a hospital in the
community
0.055 (0.114) − 0.113 (0.074)
Household is in Tirana 0.392
∗∗
(0.166) − 0.012 (0.089)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 4. First stage OLS regression of total expenditure
Log of price of protein food 0.076
∗∗∗
(0.012)
Log of price of clothing 0.156
∗∗∗
(0.009)
Log of price of alcohol–tobacco 0.027
∗∗∗
(0.008)
Log of price of other goods 0.071
∗∗∗
(0.008)
Log of price of other food 0.003 (0.007)
Female head of the household − 0.077∗∗ (0.038)
Head of the household is young (<35) − 0.068∗∗∗ (0.022)
Head of the household has university education 0.169
∗∗∗
(0.028)
Head of the household is in bad health 0.015 (0.020)
The spouse of the head is in bad health − 0.004 (0.021)
Number of children in bad health 0.027 (0.022)
Presence of more than one couple in the household 0.090
∗∗∗
(0.021)
Employment ratio: number of workers/family size 0.185
∗∗∗
(0.044)
Dwelling has no continuous water supply 0.000 (0.017)
Household is in a rural area 0.144
∗∗∗
(0.022)
Parents education difference (wife–husband) − 0.003 (0.008)
Children under 15 working (community) − 0.003 (0.006)
Proportion of female children 0.018 (0.021)
Parents age difference (wife–husband) 0.056 (0.088)
Parents age difference squared 0.058 (0.045)
Dwelling is small (<40 m2) − 0.051∗∗ (0.024)
Dwelling is big (100 m2) 0.061∗∗ (0.026)
Number of rooms in the dwelling 0.039
∗∗∗
(0.009)
Household has a telephone 0.070
∗∗∗
(0.023)
Presence of a video player 0.069
∗∗∗
(0.020)
Presence of a refrigerator 0.060
∗∗∗
(0.022)
Presence of a washing machine 0.052
∗∗
(0.021)
Presence of a generator 0.175
∗∗∗
(0.068)
Presence of air conditioning 0.192
∗∗∗
(0.066)






Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 5 presents the estimates of the collective QUAIDS demand system. The
parameters of the sharing rule are estimated jointly with the demand system, but
are shown separately in Table 7. Most income and price parameters are signifi-
cantly different from zero and with the expected sign. In general, demographic
effects are not large, though several are significantly different from zero. Head of
the household characteristics are important in determining consumption choices.
For example, when the head of the household is a woman or young, the alcohol
and tobacco share increases, while tertiary education increases the consumption
of meat and other goods (including education and cultural expenditure) and de-
creases clothing and food shares. The presence of more than one couple, typically
grandparents, reduces both alcohol–tobacco and other goods consumption. Also,
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TABLE 5. Parameters and demographic variables of the collective demand system














(0.003) − 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002) − 0.002∗ (0.001) 0.003∗ (0.001) − 0.021∗∗∗ (0.004)
0.087
∗∗∗
(0.004) − 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) − 0.080∗∗∗ (0.005)
0.018
∗∗∗
(0.001) − 0.001 (0.001) − 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002)
0.042
∗∗∗








(0.008) 0.006 (0.006) 0.028
∗∗∗









(0.006) − 0.236∗∗∗ (0.014)
β3i 0.011 (0.010) 0.085
∗∗∗
(0.007) 0.005 (0.004) 0.053
∗∗∗





(0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.020
∗∗∗









(0.002) − 0.062∗∗∗ (0.005)






(0.002) − 0.062∗∗∗ (0.005)
ηi − 0.330∗∗∗ (0.026) − 0.035∗ (0.020)
ζ i 0.059 (0.087) − 0.094 (0.297) − 0.015 (0.148) 0.012 (0.028) 0.039 (0.344)
Female head of the household 0.009 (0.007) − 0.010 (0.006) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) − 0.012 (0.011)
Head of the household is young
(<35)
− 0.006 (0.005) − 0.001 (0.004) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) − 0.015∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.011 (0.007)
term
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(0.006) − 0.013∗∗∗ (0.005) − 0.001 (0.002) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) − 0.018∗∗ (0.009)
Head of the household is in bad
health
0.002 (0.005) − 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) − 0.005∗ (0.003) 0.001 (0.007)
The spouse of the head is in bad
health
− 0.007 (0.005) − 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) − 0.002 (0.003) 0.008 (0.007)
Number of children in bad health − 0.007 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) − 0.001 (0.002) 0.005∗ (0.003) − 0.001 (0.007)
Presence of more than one
couple in the household
0.007 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) − 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) − 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.005 (0.007)




(0.010) 0.010 (0.009) 0.005 (0.004) − 0.002 (0.006) − 0.048∗∗∗ (0.015)
Dwelling has no continuous
water supply
0.001 (0.004) − 0.008∗∗ (0.003) − 0.001 (0.001) 0.004∗ (0.002) 0.003 (0.006)
Household is in a rural area − 0.011∗∗ (0.004) − 0.005 (0.004) − 0.004∗∗ (0.002) − 0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.027∗∗∗ (0.007)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
term
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the ratio between the number of workers and family size has a significant impact,
increasing protein food consumption and reducing other food consumption. Living
in a rural area reduces consumption in all categories except other food.
Table 6 shows individual-specific income elasticities for males, females, and
children, and household price elasticities along with the associated standard errors.
Signs are consistent with the theory. Individual Engel effects are important because
they enable the prediction of how changes in the sharing rule may affect household
consumption decisions. Men reveal near unity elasticities for all categories but
other goods, which is inelastic. Females show larger elasticities for protein food,
clothing, and alcohol–tobacco, while other goods have a unity elasticity, other food
is slightly inelastic. Children reveal a rather different pattern, with unit elasticity
for protein food and other food, small elasticities for clothing and alcohol and
tobacco, and a large elasticity for other goods. This pattern is as expected because
other goods includes cultural, educational, and recreational expenditure as the most
relevant items, which are important for children but less so for adults, especially
males. The comparison of uncompensated and compensated price elasticities in the
middle and at the bottom of Table 6 reveals that the size of the income term of the
Slutsky matrix evaluated at the means is relatively small with the notable exception
of protein and other food. As required by consumption theory, all diagonal terms
are negative. The own price effect of protein food is relatively more elastic, while
that of alcohol and tobacco and other foods are quite inelastic. The cross-effects
of the compensated price elasticities show generally significant complementary
relations of alcohol with protein food, clothing, and other goods, while protein
food and other food tend to be substitutes for the other categories.
The estimates of the parameters of the sharing function mk (z) are shown in
Table 7. The effect of a difference in the educational levels of men and women
has the expected effect, increasing the bargaining power of women who are more
educated than their husbands. The difference in age between the parents, and
its square, has a similar effect. Living in a community where a relevant share
of children work has a positive impact on men and children resource shares and
negative on females. This might indicate that children have more bargaining power
as possible sources of revenue [Basu (2006)], but it might also indicate simply that
the type of work is agricultural, and the prevailing culture patriarchal, and hence
susceptible to gender discrimination. As to the concern about the discrimination
of female children within the household, our results indicate that the proportion of
female children improves the child sharing rule, even though this happens at the
expense of female adults rather than males.
The predicted sharing rules, presented in Table 8 and Figure 1, show how re-
sources are distributed among household members. In Albania, on average, male
members control about 35.1% of the household resource pool mainly at the expense
of female members who remain with 26.3% of resources. Children have 38.6%
of resources. These average figures show that the distribution of resources within
the family is quite unequal. The bargaining power of Albanian women is much
weaker than men’s. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the gap in the share of
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2017.24

















TABLE 6. Income and price elasticities
Income Protein food Clothing Alcohol–tobacco Other goods Other food
Male 1.055 (0.028) 0.993 (0.028) 1.078 (0.055) 0.315 (0.058) 1.036 (0.009)
Female 1.105 (0.021) 1.152 (0.025) 1.154 (0.047) 1.024 (0.051) 0.936 (0.007)
Child 1.001 (0.021) 0.774 (0.025) 0.939 (0.046) 1.241 (0.039) 1.029 (0.007)
Uncompensated Protein food Clothing Alcohol–tobacco Other goods Other food
Protein food − 0.886 (0.017) − 0.206 (0.012) − 0.033 (0.005) − 0.051 (0.008) 0.016 (0.010)
Clothing − 0.152 (0.016) − 0.525 (0.018) − 0.070 (0.007) − 0.104 (0.010) − 0.068 (0.012)
Alcohol–tobacco − 0.157 (0.033) − 0.428 (0.031) − 0.374 (0.060) − 0.163 (0.022) − 0.049 (0.025)
Other goods 0.006 (0.032) − 0.151 (0.030) − 0.043 (0.014) − 0.262 (0.036) − 0.130 (0.022)
Other food 0.008 (0.004) − 0.012 (0.003) − 0.002 (0.002) − 0.015 (0.002) − 0.979 (0.004)
Compensated Protein food Clothing Alcohol–tobacco Other goods Other food
Protein food − 0.729 (0.028) − 0.049 (0.022) 0.125 (0.016) 0.107 (0.018) 0.173 (0.021)
Clothing − 0.045 (0.024) − 0.419 (0.026) 0.036 (0.016) 0.003 (0.019) 0.039 (0.021)
Alcohol–tobacco − 0.141 (0.036) − 0.412 (0.033) − 0.358 (0.062) − 0.147 (0.024) − 0.033 (0.027)
Other goods 0.044 (0.039) − 0.112 (0.037) − 0.004 (0.021) − 0.223 (0.043) − 0.091 (0.029)
Other food 0.616 (0.017) 0.596 (0.017) 0.606 (0.015) 0.593 (0.016) − 0.371 (0.018)
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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− 0.088∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.162∗∗∗ (0.026) − 0.074∗∗∗ (0.022)




(0.020) − 0.141∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.017)
Proportion of female children 0.059 (0.094) − 0.242∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.183∗∗∗ (0.063)
Parents age difference
(wife–husband)
− 0.624∗∗ (0.273) 1.164∗∗∗ (0.297) − 0.541∗∗ (0.244)
Parents age difference
squared
− 0.281∗∗ (0.138) 0.571∗∗∗ (0.148) − 0.291∗∗ (0.120)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
TABLE 8. Estimated resource share: descriptive
statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ln y 9.401 0.487 7.771 11.543
lnφm 3.300 0.390 1.278 5.369
lnφf 2.478 0.486 0.552 6.131
lnφc 3.632 0.491 2.205 7.815
ln mm(·) 0.279 0.132 − 0.116 0.695
ln mf(·) − 0.623 0.289 − 1.542 0.137
ln mc(·) 0.344 0.167 − 0.081 0.860
sm = lnφm/ln y 0.351 0.038 0.123 0.525
sf = lnφf/ln y 0.263 0.048 0.058 0.587
sc = lnφc/ln y 0.386 0.050 0.225 0.782
σ m 0.320 0.037 0.086 0.544
σ f 0.328 0.037 0.091 0.660
σ c 0.352 0.056 0.158 0.819
resources tends to reduce with household expenditure, but remaining substantially
far from an equal distribution even for rich households. This evidence is in line with
the Albanian patriarchal family model that excludes women from the household
decision-making process.
These results are strong signals of a critical situation for Albanian mothers.
Moreover, women have an even lower resource share in favor of children when-
ever at risk, a situation that may occur when child labor is particularly widespread
and when the majority of children are female. In the next subsection, we seek
further insights on these issues by implementing a post-estimation analysis on the
sharing rule, concentrating on the effects of migration on the share of resources
for left behind family members, a critical situation that could not be modeled as a
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2017.24
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FIGURE 1. Densities and distribution of the predicted shares of resources.
distribution factor. Prior to that, however, we present the results of a robustness
analysis aimed at assessing the stability of the estimates of intrahousehold distri-
bution of resources with respect to several model assumptions and specifications
changes.
5.2. Robustness Analysis
The results reported in the previous subsection account for a series of empirical
concerns that may bias the estimated coefficient, such as endogeneity of total
expenditure and infrequency of purchases. To verify whether these corrections
are important for the estimation of the distribution of resources within the house-
hold, we present the results of alternative estimations without such corrections.
In addition, because the sharing rule depends heavily on the observed share of
expenditure, we also present the results of alternative definitions of σ k that ac-
count for the possibility of within-group economies of scale and do not assume
equal sharing of nonassignable goods. Finally, because the “other goods” category
include expenditure in items that might be considered partially public, we also
present the results for a demand system that excludes this category. The statistics
of the predicted share of resources for males, female, and children (mean and
standard deviation) for each of the robustness analyses are presented in Table 9.
In particular, the first row of the table (labeled “0.”) reports the share of resources
from the main estimation and the subsequent rows the results from the following
alternatives:
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TABLE 9. Estimated resource share: robustness analysis
Male Female Child
0. Full model specification 0.3507 (0.0375) 0.2630 (0.0475) 0.3863 (0.0497)
1. No sample selection bias
correction
0.3535 (0.0378) 0.2596 (0.0478) 0.3869 (0.0497)
2. No total expenditure
endogeneity
0.3530 (0.0378) 0.2609 (0.0476) 0.3860 (0.0497)
3. No sample selection and
endogeneity
0.3523 (0.0376) 0.2603 (0.0476) 0.3873 (0.0497)
4. Square root within group
equivalence scale
0.3532 (0.0274) 0.2694 (0.0370) 0.3775 (0.0347)
5. No public goods (“other
goods” category)
0.3614 (0.0419) 0.2546 (0.0498) 0.3839 (0.0524)
6. σ k based on assignable
consumption only
0.3564 (0.1587) 0.2752 (0.1644) 0.3684 (0.1860)
7. Prices normalized to 1 0.3398 (0.0397) 0.3132 (0.0405) 0.3470 (0.0453)
1. The sample selection bias correction was not applied to budget share equations (10),
but total expenditure is still assumed to be possibly endogenous. This estimation
would highlight whether in our sample correcting for infrequency of purchases is
relevant for estimating the distribution of resources within the household.
2. Total expenditure was assumed to be exogenous, thus avoiding the inclusion of the
residual of the first-stage regression (9) in the budget shares equation, but still cor-
recting for infrequency of purchases.
3. Both sample selection bias and total expenditure endogeneity corrections were not
applied. This corresponds to directly estimating the collective demand system in
equation (6).
4. Economies of scale have been allowed within family groups (i.e. among males, fe-
males, and children separately). The main model assumes that resources are dis-
tributed equally within groups, because there is no information on assignable con-
sumption for individuals with the same characteristics. By using a square root scale







the corresponding share σ k = ek/kek, we try to assess whether the estimation of
intrahousehold resources distribution is robust to different assumptions about within-
group economies of scale.
5. The “other goods” category has been excluded from the demand system. Being an
heterogeneous category, it includes items that may be safely considered private, such
as education and personal care, and others that may more likely be partially public
goods, as leisure, banking, and nonspecified goods and services. Because the pro-
posed model assumes that all goods are privately consumed, with this alternative
specification we aim at testing the robustness of our results to small violations of
such assumption.
6. σ k has been computed using only assignable consumption expenditure information.
Although the assumption of equal sharing of nonassignable consumption has been
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proven to be neutral for the estimation of the sharing function [Menon and Perali
(2012)], as a robustness check we also estimated the collective demand system under
the assumption that nonassignable consumption is distributed in the same way as





and σ k =
ek/kek.
7. All prices have been normalized to 1. Because price information is not available
for all consumption categories, pseudo unit values have been created for nonfood
items [Lewbel (1989)]. An alternative strategy could have been to normalize all
prices to 1, that is reduce the demand system to a system of Engel curves, where no
coefficient associated with price information is estimated and much of the structure
of the QUAIDS is removed. This implies significant changes to equation (10), which
reduces to
wi = ̂i[αi + ti(d) + β1i
(
ln φ1




) + λ3i (ln φ3)2] + ηiψ̂i + ζiω̂ + ξi,
with ln φ∗k (y, z) = ln yk + ln mk (z).
Notably, as shown in Table 9, all these estimations produce a nearly identical
intrahousehold distribution of resources as the main model except the last one,
implying a sound robustness of our results. In particular, robustness 1–3 indicate
that in our sample, selection bias and total expenditure endogeneity are not impor-
tant for the determination of intrahousehold allocation of resources. Estimation 4
provides evidence that the assumption of equal sharing within household member
categories is neutral to the estimation of intrahousehold distribution of resources.
Excluding public goods (estimation 5) produce again very similar results, slightly
increasing intrahousehold inequality but in the same direction of the main model.
This suggests that not properly accounting for public goods might produce an slight
underestimation of intrahousehold inequality in our sample. Robustness 6, which
bases the calculation of σ k uniquely on assignable expenditure, has the drawback
of producing several zeros in the σ k that must be dropped from estimation (1,191
obs.). Despite of having different samples in size and composition, this estimation
produces an almost identical distribution of resources within the household, pro-
viding empirical evidence to the theoretical result about the neutrality of assuming
equal sharing of nonassignable expenditure. Finally, we expected more important
deviations with the last specification (robustness 7), where all prices are normal-
ized to 1. This is a rather strong simplification of the main model and reduces
the demand system to an Engel curves system that loses a significant portion of
structure and theoretical restrictions. Despite the radical changes to the model, the
predicted intrahousehold inequality goes in the same “direction” of discriminating
women as in the main model. The difference in the intrahousehold distribution of
resources with respect to the main model, however, is somewhat larger than the
other robustness checks.
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5.3. The Impact of Migration on the Intrahousehold Distribution of
Resources
When a parent migrates abroad, the distribution of resources within the house-
hold may substantially change. It frees part of the home resources that become
available for other members of the household and may bring new resources by
sending remittances. In our sample, about 98% of migrants send remittances to
the left behind household. Among those sending remittances, the primary declared
objective is to buy food or goods of necessity (57% of households), to invest in
construction (12%), and to cover medical expenses (12%). The declared objective
is child support only for 3% of households, while remittances are never used for
educational purposes.20 The remainder is more or less evenly distributed across
purchasing a durable good, paying for a wedding or funeral, charity, investment in
the household enterprise, and other uses.
Most migrant fathers leave behind their spouses and children with other adult
males in the household and send them remittances. The resources freed by the
migrant member plus the remittances sent are likely to be reallocated between
the remaining adult males, adult females, and children. We expect two kinds of
behavioral reactions to the migratory event: the wife may take over the control of
household resources and decide on the reallocation, probably favoring children.
Alternatively, in the patriarchal tradition, the control of resources may shift to the
older remaining males, which would probably keep a distribution of resources
similar to the pre-migration state.21 The two scenarios can be analyzed using the
information on household headship reported in the survey. Only 49% of migrant-
sending families have female headship, suggesting that the migrant’s spouse is
taking control over resources. In both cases, we expect that the male share of
resources falls, since there is one adult male less in the household, and that the
beneficiary of redistribution are the children since (a) women are naturally more
caring toward children or (b) older males may have stronger traditional values that
tend to discriminate women. We intend to disentangle these aspects by controlling
for the presence of the elderly and women registered as the head of the household.
The endogenous binary model described in Section 3 is estimated by Full Infor-
mation Maximum Likelihood (Tables 10 and 11) using only significant exclusion
restrictions, which implies keeping the district share of migrants to Italy and ex-
cluding the shares of migrants to Greece and other EU countries.22
Although the proposed model is nonlinear and estimated by maximum like-
lihood, to check the effectiveness of the exclusion restrictions, a series of tests
treating the model as a linear IV have been performed. The F test of joint signifi-
cance of the instruments is 11.65 with a partial R2 of 0.0196. The null hypothesis
of weak instruments can be rejected since the F test is larger than the critical
value with a 10% OLS relative bias tolerance [Stock and Yogo (2005)]. The Wald
tests performed on the endogenous binary variable specifications reject the null
hypothesis of no correlation between the treatment and outcome error terms for
male’s and child’s equations (see Table 10).
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TABLE 10. Endogenous binary variable model – first stage (being left behind)
Variables Male Female Child
Constant − 1.712∗∗∗ (0.192) − 1.693∗∗∗ (0.203) − 1.548∗∗∗ (0.183)













− 0.061∗∗∗ (0.015) − 0.055∗∗∗ (0.015) − 0.063∗∗∗ (0.013)
District share of migrants









Presence of more than one
couple in the household
− 0.006∗ (0.004) − 0.007∗ (0.004) − 0.007∗∗ (0.003)
Distance from services (in
minutes on foot)
− 0.266 (0.165) − 0.256 (0.165) − 0.245 (0.158)
Household is in the costal
area
− 0.110 (0.159) − 0.119 (0.159) − 0.030 (0.151)
Household is in the central
area
− 0.234 (0.159) − 0.273∗ (0.156) − 0.092 (0.148)
Household is in the
mountain area
− 0.104 (0.196) − 0.064 (0.184) 0.015 (0.187)
ρ 0.445 (0.100) 0.030 (0.152) − 0.727 (0.046)
σ 0.035 (0.001) 0.036 (0.001) 0.047 (0.002)
Wald test (ρ = 0)
χ 2 14.68 0.04 91.12
p > χ 2 0.000 0.846 0.000







Table 10 shows the treatment equations of the post-estimation analysis of the
share of resources for each family member. The coefficients of the exclusion re-
strictions, the district share of families with migrants leaving behind the wives
and/or children in the period 1990–2001, the number of associations providing
community services present in the community, and the district share of migrants
that went to Italy in the period 1990–2001, are all significant at 1%. Thus, net-
works seem to play an important role in migration to Italy, where well-established
Albanian communities can be found and the migration periods are longer than
Greece. The treatment equations include controls for the presence of other couples
in the household (significant at 10% in all equations), the area of residence, and
the distance from community services.
Tables 11 shows the outcome equations. Here the share of resources of each
household member is regressed on a set of relevant variables, including the dis-
tribution factors used in the collective demand system estimation, a set of house-
hold characteristics and a set of variables related to the migration of a household
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TABLE 11. Endogenous binary variable model – outcome (resource shares)






















− 0.074∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.132∗∗∗ (0.009) − 0.059∗∗∗ (0.010)
Parents age
difference squared










− 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) − 0.003 (0.004)
Household is in a
rural area




− 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) − 0.000 (0.001)
Education of the
spouse
0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) − 0.001 (0.001)
Average age of
children

















0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) − 0.002 (0.002)
Number of elderly
(>65)
− 0.001 (0.002) − 0.003∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗ (0.002)
Number of male
adults
− 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003∗∗ (0.002)
Number of female
adults
− 0.001 (0.001) − 0.003∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗ (0.002)
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TABLE 11. Continued
Variables Male Female Child
Household is in the
coastal area
− 0.007∗∗ (0.003) − 0.001 (0.003) 0.008∗∗ (0.004)
Household is in the
central area
− 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) − 0.001 (0.004)




(0.003) − 0.007∗ (0.004)
Presence of more








0.000 (0.000) − 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Migration variables
Log of remittances
for the left behind
0.001 (0.001) − 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001)
Female head of the
household
− 0.008∗ (0.005) − 0.003 (0.007) 0.010∗ (0.006)





(0.002) − 0.026∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.021∗∗∗ (0.003)
× left behind 0.003 (0.008) − 0.024∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.021∗∗ (0.009)
Left behind − 0.043∗∗ (0.017) 0.015 (0.027) 0.066∗∗∗ (0.015)
ATE1 of being left
behind
− 0.044∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.016 (0.028) 0.066∗∗∗ (0.016)
ATET1 of being left
behind
− 0.046∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.017 (0.026) 0.066∗∗∗ (0.015)







1. ATE and ATET stand for Average Treatment Effect and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, respectively.
member. The last two lines of the tables give the ATE and ATET of being left
behind. The results show that having a migrant parent reduces a male adult’s share
of resources by 4.6 percentage points and improves that of children by 6.6 percent-
age points, while the ATET on a woman’s share of resources is not significantly
different from zero.23 These findings may be due to two different factors suggested
by the literature. The first follows the Basu and Van (1998) hypothesis that children,
in this case, making up for the loss of labor of the migrant member, increase their
bargaining power. An alternative explanation could be that the mother decides to
allocate the share of resources of the migrant husband to the children. This would
reinforce the vision that when the bargaining power is shifted to women they ded-
icate more resources to children, especially girls as suggested in previous studies
[Duflo (2000), Duflo (2003), Attanasio and Lechene (2014), Antman (2015)].
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As to the specific parameters of each equation, being left behind has a negative
and significant impact on male resource share. Oddly, the more female children
there are, the greater is the share of resources of adult males, but only in families
that are not left behind. However, if the head of the household is a woman, the
reduction in the share of resources to males is significant but smaller for left behind
families. As expected, the distribution factors significantly affect the resource share
of males, and with the same sign of the collective demand system estimation.
Geographical variables are not relevant, except for living in a coastal area, which
moderately reduces the male share of resources. Family composition, as expected,
is also important. The share of resources of males is smaller when there are more
male adults and when children are older.
Inspection of the results referring to female resource share shows that having
a larger proportion of female children reduces the woman’s share both for left
behind and not by a similar magnitude. On the other hand, a household headed by
a woman does not increase the share of resources to women, left behind or not.
When children are older, the share falls but the number of young children increases
women’s share. Although an elderly head of the household does not allocate less
resources to women, the number of elderly has a negative impact. As expected,
the share reduces with the number of female adults.
Children’s share of resources substantially increase when left behind and in
nonleft behind households headed by a woman. A higher proportion of female
children always increases the share of resources devoted to children [in line with
Duflo (2000, 2003) and Antman (2015)]. It is worth noting that this increase always
happens at the expense of the woman’s share. Again the distribution factors act
with the same sign and significance as in the demand system estimation. Living
in a coastal area significantly increases the share of resources, while living in the
mountain area reduces it. The average age of children plays a significant role in
increasing the children’s share of resources, probably because older children are
able to help more in household and farm duties, allowing them to increase their
bargaining power. Family composition is important, with the expected signs and
significance.
One of the strongest concerns in relation to the migration of fathers is the pos-
sibility that the headship of the household shifts to elderly members following
traditional patriarchal household patterns, to the detriment of women and children
[Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010), Antman (2011), and Antman (2012)]. How-
ever, the results show no significant impacts of elderly headship on the distribution
of resources within the household, while an increased number of elderly tends to
shift resources from women to children.
The overall picture has clearly defined traits. Children in Albania are effectively
protected from the risks associated with male migration both by their mothers or
by elder household members taking control of resources. When a variable has a
positive impact on the share of resources assigned to children, in most cases it
has a negative impact on a woman’s share, and a nonsignificant or positive impact
on a man’s share. Our evidence shows that when the father is absent, the mother
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is willing to give the resources freed by the migrant to children, in particular
when there are more females. Again, it is worth noting that women do not keep
resources left by the migrant husband for themselves, as being left behind in the
female equation is never significant.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study applies the collective consumption framework to the measurement of
distribution of resources within Albanian households, placing special emphasis on
the impact of international migration of one parent and on possible discrimination
arising from an unequal distribution of resources. The analysis is conducted on
households with children, observed by the Albanian Living Standard Measurement
Survey in 2002.
Albanian households have been deeply affected by the transition to a market
economy from a regime that reduced the intensity of the previous patriarchal
tradition. One of the social effects of transition was the restoration of traditional and
strongly patriarchal values with customs and laws at the village level and the risk
of relegating women to a marginal role, especially in rural areas. At the same time,
the household structure changed deeply due to sustained migration flows affecting
family stability. In order to improve our understanding of these delicate economic
and social issues, our study provides detailed information about the distribution of
household resources between genders and generations and its relation to migration.
To achieve this objective, we identify a sharing rule for the adult male and female
component and a sharing rule for children along with their individual Engel effects
using a collective complete demand system. We also analyze the impact of being
left behind by a migrant parent on the resource share of each household member
by means of an endogenous binary variable model.
Our results suggest that when a father migrates abroad leaving the family at
home, and the control of family resources shifts to the mother, substantially more
resources are allocated to children, especially when the proportion of female chil-
dren is larger and at the expense of the woman’s resource share. We also find no
evidence of a significant change in the distribution of resources when the control of
resources shifts to older males. Irrespectively of the left-behind status, the woman’s
share of resources is substantially lower than an equal distribution.
The presence of intrahousehold inequality affecting women and the study of its
determinants suggest some policy intervention aimed at promoting gender parity,
such as incentives for female education and work participation. These policies
would improve the relative bargaining position of women in relation to men, re-
ducing the risk of female discrimination within the household, and indirectly favor
households investment on children.
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NOTES
1 With the collapse of the communist regime, the supporting system of kindergartens and day-care
nurseries that had been put in place to enable women to participate in the labor market also crumbled.
2 To the best of our knowledge, the most relevant contribution on collective consumption models
with public good is Browning et al. (2013), which estimates the sharing rule with purely private and
purely public goods, and suggest how to extend the proposed model to allow for partially public
goods (without performing an actual estimate). Their model, however, requires the strong assumption
of singles and married individuals to have the same preferences. Here, it is not possible to use this
approach because children are bargaining agents and it is never possible to observe children living
alone. In addition, as discussed in Chiappori and Meghir (2015), the a proper dealing with public
goods is especially relevant for welfare analysis, which is not conducted the present study.
3 For clarity of notation, index k = 1, 2, 3 refers to household members, while j and i index goods.
Further, superscript k = 1, 2, 3 is associated with endogenous variables and subscript k = 1, 2, 3 with
exogenous variables.
4 We recognize that it would be possible to derive shadow prices at the individual level using, for
example, a household technology a la Barten (1964) through a scaling modification of prices [Atella
et al. (2004) and Browning et al. (2013)]. Instead, a technology that scales income rather than prices
is used, as discussed in Section 2.1. The skewed consumption of assignable goods induces an income
redistribution effect within the family. For example, at the same level of total expenditure, families
with a male “bias” may spend less on female or children’s goods. Our empirical identification strategy
aims to capture these income reallocation effects.
5 The assignment of one-third of the committed expenditure to each member of the family is used
here to illustrate the derivation of individual demands but has no implications for the estimation of the
collective demand system because the term ln A(p) = ln A1(p) + ln A2(p) + ln A3(p) is specified at
the household level.
6 As shown in Menon and Perali (2012, Proposition 5 and Appendix A), the assumption of an
equal distribution of nonassignable expenditure is an innocent normalization, as it does not affect the
relative magnitude of the parameters of the scaling function. An alternative assumption could be that
the overall consumption expenditure is distributed as the small fraction represented by the assignable
expenditure, but with some caveats. This alternative assumption is presented as part of the robustness
analysis and discuss in Section 5.
7 This definition of σ k is possible because of the no-public good assumption, as it implies that
consumption is distributed equally and with no economies of scales within each member category k. A
a robustness check, an alternative assumption that allows for economies of scale within each category
k is presented in Section 5.
8 Atella et al. (2004) estimate a complete quadratic demand system using a time series of cross-
sections of Italian household budgets including, in turn, aggregate price indices and unit values con-
structed a la Lewbel (1989). The results show that the matrix of compensated price elasticities is negative
semi-definite only if estimated unit values are used. In order to have a counterfactual experiment, the
study also considers a household survey with actual unit values and compare them with Lewbel-type
unit values. The experiment shows that in most cases unit values maintain the relevant characteristics
of the distribution of actual unit values. Overall, the study concludes that reconstructed unit values are
better than aggregate price indices for sound demand and welfare analysis. Menon et al. (2017b) have
recently proposed a Stata command that performs this task.
9 Good i is a good category of the demand system, which is the aggregation of j sub-category goods.
For example, food is the aggregation of fruit, vegetables, bread, and so on.
10 2005, 2008, and 2012 data could not be used because it was not possible to reconstruct con-
sumption sub-categories as needed for pseudo unit-value estimation (as explained in Section 3).
11 Protein food is disentangled from other foods such as cereals, fruit, and vegetables because the
former is generally considered a luxury food in Albania.
12 Respect to the assumption that all consumption is private, in the present sample, 81.4% of
household expenditure is composed of purely private goods (food, alcohol, and tobacco). Adding
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clothing, which is likely to be private at least for adults, raises the share to almost 94.2%. The remaining
5.8% include goods that are likely to be at least partially public, as leisure expenditure. Because it is
assumed that also these goods are purely private, a robustness check where the model is estimated
excluding this consumption category is presented in Section 5.
13 Household expenditure on the selected goods represent only about 38% of total household
consumption used by the World Bank for poverty analysis, however, the two measures have a very
large correlation coefficient (0.937), indicating that our consumption choice is a good proxy of total
household consumption.
14 In the choice of the demographic variables and distribution factors to include in the demand
system estimation, a special care have been posed in including only exogenous demographic variables
and distribution factors. The objective is to have a robust estimation of the sharing rule, whose prediction
can then be subsequently investigated with a post-estimation analysis.
15 In most cases, about 95%, the migrant is the father confirming the gendered nature of migration
in Albania [Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) and Mendola and Carletto (2012)].
16 The question is asked to the community chief and is part of the community questionnaire for
the 2002 survey, which is independent of the household questionnaire. Thus, it can be treateds as an
exogenous data source.
17 Even if family composition can be an important explanatory factor in modeling migration, all
these variables have been excluded from the selection equation in order to avoid possible endogeneity of
family composition respect to migration. However, endogeneity of changes in household composition
with migration, should be addressed by modeling the migration decision, so they should influence the
sharing rule only through the left behind status.
18 It is worth noting that while it may seem straightforward to use the sharing rule to perform
welfare analysis, as shown by Chiappori and Meghir (2015), this is a more delicate issue. In particular,
the proposed model disregards whether some goods consumed by the household are (partially) public
goods, along with the associated economies of scale and household production technologies. The
data requirements for a collective consumption model with public goods and household production,
however, are demanding and Albanian data are not suitable for this analysis.
19 The Stock–Yogo critical value for a maximum bias of the IV estimator of 5% is 20.74.
20 This is in line with Cattaneo (2012), who finds that remittances have no impact on education
expenditure, and with Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010), who find a negative impact of parental
migration on children’s schooling.
21 There is evidence that migrant fathers often send remittances to their parents rather than their
wives [King and Vullnetari (2009)].
22 Their inclusion produces almost identical results, but at the cost of worsening validity tests on
the instruments.
23 As a robustness check, we ran regressions on the relative sharing rule by using a standard OLS
estimator (assuming exogeneity of being left behind) and a standard IV regression (thus, neglecting
the binary nature of the endogenous variable). While OLS regressions revealed weaker and mostly
nonsignificant ATEs, the IV regressions produce similar results, with the ATE on male share of resources
being slightly larger (−0.059), the female ATE being nonsignificant, and child ATE being slightly larger
(0.100) than our main results. These results are available upon request.
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